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Self-talk is one of the classic topics in sports and exercise psychology (Vealey, 23 
1994). Since the first studies of self-talk in sports, the literature has steadily grown to a 24 
point where the concept of self-talk represented various psychological processes and 25 
skills (Hardy, Comoutos, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2018). In our review article, we had 26 
identified developments in self-talk that led us to propose a new integrative 27 
conceptualization that both reflects previous approaches and evidence and facilitates a 28 
more coherent body of research conducted in the future (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, 29 
Comoutos, & Hardy, 2019). Accordingly, self-talk takes form in verbalizations addressed 30 
to the self, overtly or covertly, characterized by interpretative elements associated to their 31 
content, and it either (a) reflects dynamic interplays between organic, spontaneous and 32 
goal-directed cognitive processes or (b) conveys messages to activate responses through 33 
the use of predetermined cues developed strategically, to achieve performance related 34 
outcomes. 35 
 36 
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In a spirit of constructive criticism, Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens, and Brewer 
(2019) voiced concerns about our work; we address their main points in this reply. 
Chiefly, Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens et al. expressed their concerns about (a) the 
conceptual approach and the proposed “common language” for the discussion of self-talk; 
(b) the limited benefits of how our approach, which focuses on taxonomy and 
categorization, could serve as a guide for future research; and (c) the validity of the self-
talk assessment in sports self-talk literature (a topic we note was outside of our original 
article). Although there are a few issues we might quibble about, in the following sections, 
we look at Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens et al.’s three overarching criticisms to provide 
a balanced perspective on each of them and, when appropriate, clarify out our own stance 
on the matter.  
The conceptual approach 
The most fundamental distinction that we make within the self-talk phenomena 
distinguishes organic self-talk as part of human cognition from the use of strategic self-
talk. We describe organic self-talk as verbalizations, addressed to the self, that reflect 
various spontaneous and goal-directed psychological events (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, 
et al., 2019). Importantly, this self-talk is not a constituent of an intervention, although it 
can be indirectly influenced by interventions such as cognitive–behavioral therapy or 
mindfulness-acceptance approaches. On the other hand, strategic self-talk is described as 
a process of mechanically verbalizing predetermined keywords and phrases to achieve 
performance-related outcomes (e.g., Galanis, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, Charachousi, 
& Sanchez, 2018). Ziegler (1987), in her classic study, even named these procedures self-
cueing instead of self-talk. Strategic self-talk has been examined in many intervention 
studies, which have generally evidenced its potential to be beneficial in sport. 
Overall, organic self-talk is the result of sustained psychological and cognitive 
processes, whereas strategic self-talk is more based on behavioral rules, as predetermined 
plans have to be followed (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019). On the one hand, an 
athlete can debate internally after a mistake, where the mistake was, and how it can be 
resolved in the future (e.g., “I hit the ball way too late” or “Move quickly to get a better 
position next time”). On the other hand, an athlete can repeat cue words (e.g., fast [to 
prepare to receive the ball]) at set times (e.g., when the ball is moving in his or her 
direction) as determined before the game. 
Contrary to our stance, Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens, et al. (2019) argued that 
there was a lack of theoretical clarity and empirical support to distinguish strategic self-
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talk from naturally occurring organic self-talk. In particular, Van Raalte, Vincent, 
Dickens et al. reasoned that strategic self-talk has considerable overlap with self-talk that 
can be considered as organic, goal-directed self-talk. In their view, strategic and organic 
goal-directed self-talk are (a) predetermined, (b) fixed, and (c) typically said out loud. 
Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens et al. claimed that these categories are not orthogonal. They 
affirmed that it might be useful to consider them as belonging to the same category, as 
non-mutually exclusive categories have limited benefits. 
Although we agree that strategic and goal-directed self-talk have some 
similarities, especially with regard to their use for performance enhancement, we would 
never consider self-talk as simultaneously belonging to both categories. Goal-directed 
and strategic self-talk differ in their origin and use. While the content and use of cue 
words in strategic self-talk are always predetermined and frequently fixed (which is not 
always related to the self-determination of self-talk content; Hardy, 2006), the decision 
to use goal-directed self-talk results always from momentary events. Characteristically, 
the content of goal-directed self-talk is never predetermined, and the time of verbalization 
is never prefixed, since both the content and the timing arise from ongoing cognitive self-
regulatory processes. Conversely, strategic self-talk arises from predetermined plans. 
With regard to the self-talk dimension, which is referred to as overtness, Hardy 
(2006) conceived this as a spectrum: from self-talk said silently (covertly) to self-talk said 
out aloud (overtly). It is important that the overtness of self-talk is independent of its 
origins. That strategic and goal directed self-talk can be expressed at times either overtly 
or covertly by no means justifies that “it may be useful to consider them as belonging to 
the same category because categories that are not mutually exclusive have limited utility.” 
With this overtness justification in mind, spontaneous and goal-directed (or System 1 and 
System 2) self-talk are not mutually exclusive, and their distinction would therefore make 
little sense (which is incorrect). Self-talk is an overarching concept, and naturally, there 
are common attributes that describe its various subordinate components. 
Some specific conceptually oriented discussion points deserve further 
consideration. First, regarding awareness in goal-directed self-talk, we refer to arguments 
related to automatic and unconscious use of psychological skills (Nicholls & Polman, 
2007). The prevailing view is that some level of conscious control is always required, 
although psychological skills can become routine (Crocker, Tamminen, & Gaudreau, 
2015). For instance, some statements can become mantras and pronounced almost 
automatically. Nevertheless, their use is always based on a certain degree of 
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consciousness. Second, concerning strategic self-talk that is normally part of 
interventions (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Galanis, & Theodorakis, 2011), we recognize 
that it may also stem from reflections from the athlete. However, these considerations do 
not take place during but before the sport. In this sense, it is a strategic but self-managed 
intervention when, for example, athletes decide at home which keywords they use later 
during training (i.e., self-talk use is predetermined and prefixed). 
Third, strategic self-talk interventions, like so many other events in life, can shape 
athletes’ goal-directed self-talk when athletes decide, during sport practice, to use the 
keywords they have previously trained with (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019). 
Fourth, although we recognize a clear conceptual difference between strategic and goal-
directed self-talk, no study has yet attempted to compare their neurobiological cores. 
However, very closely related to this topic, Alderson-Day et al. (2016) have compared 
neurological activation patterns between nomologic inner speech (similar to the use of 
cue words and phrases as strategic self-talk) and dialogic inner speech (similar to the 
interplay between spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk). The results showed that 
different types of self-talk are indeed neurologically distinguished phenomena. 
Another cornerstone of our conceptualization is the subdivision of organic self-
talk into spontaneous and goal-directed subtypes. Spontaneous self-talk consists of 
verbalizations that arise unintentionally and effortlessly. Goal-directed self-talk, on the 
other hand, is described as a verbalization intentionally used to solve a problem or 
progress on a task (Latinjak, Zourbanos, López-Ros, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2014). Van 
Raalte, Vincent, Dickens, et al. (2019) argued that the terms spontaneous and goal-
directed are domain-specific and therefore do not have the breadth of the two-factor 
model language (i.e., System 1 and System 2) already established in many areas of 
psychology. Nevertheless, the spontaneous/goal-directed terminology has already gained 
a foothold in the lexicon of other research groups (Boudreault, Trottier, & Provencher, 
2018; Hase, Hood, Moore, & Freeman, 2019; Tay, Valshtein, Krott, & Oettingen, 2019; 
Walter, Nikoleizig, & Alfermann, 2019). 
There is agreement in that spontaneous self-talk overlaps with System 1 self-talk 
and that goal-directed self-talk is akin to System 2 self-talk. Both our views are derived 
from traditional two-factor thought models (Kahneman, 2011) that have been used in 
various areas of sports and exercise psychology (Furley, Schweizer, & Bertrams, 2015). 
However, we prefer the terms spontaneous and goal-directed because such labelling is 
more explicit and easily understood by nonexperts, applied practitioners, coaches, and 
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athletes. The function of concepts is to specify the features, attributes, or properties of a 
phenomenon (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2016). We believe that our 
spontaneous/goal-directed terminology better meets this requirement than System 1 and 
System 2 labels. 
Irrespective of the terminology used, when considering both types of organic (i.e., 
spontaneous and goal-directed) self-talk, the crux of the matter for their distinction is 
cognitive origin: (a) be it a spontaneous expression of psychological processes such as 
emotions, motivation or performance beliefs or (b) a deliberate effort to strengthen the 
self-control necessary to achieve relevant goals. We are of the belief that cognitive origins 
are far more important for the categorization of organic self-talk than the content of the 
self-talk to which Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens, et al. (2019) have referred in their 
argument. They rightly noticed that saying “bend your knees” is spontaneous when it 
comes out of anger or goal-directed when it identifies mistakes and informs of potential 
for improvement. However, rather than the content of the statements, the salient issue 
concerning spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk is the role they play in cognitive self-
regulation. Spontaneous self-talk is a default process that helps raise awareness of current 
experiences and identify psychological challenges (Van Raalte, Vincent, & Brewer, 
2016). Its counterpart, goal-directed self-talk, is specifically used to select and apply 
psychological skills as soon as a psychological challenge has been identified (Latinjak, 
Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019). 
Testable hypotheses 
In addition to the abovementioned conceptual challenges, Van Raalte, Vincent, 
Dickens, et al. (2019) have made several additional comments. The first referred to the 
verifiable hypothesis proposed in our work, or more precisely to the absence of these 
hypotheses. In particular, Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens et al. argued that our review 
contained relatively few verifiable hypotheses. They quoted our suggestion that research 
ideas can be grouped around the specific subtypes of self-talk (e.g., research on goal-
directed self-talk) or across self-talk types (e.g., research on the relation between 
spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk). However, they criticized that the only guidance 
we gave to other researchers was to use our conceptualization approach. 
We agree that only a few hypotheses have been explicitly stated. We do not 
believe that worthwhile conceptual models must necessarily incorporate hypotheses for 
them to be valuable. For a comparison, the interested reader is referred to Carron, 
Widmeyer, and Brawley’s (1985) highly influential conceptual framework of team 
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cohesion that helped to offer both clarity within the sports psychology literature as well 
as attract praise from outside it. In addition, we have, of course, proposed our 
conceptualization in the hope that other authors will use it to clarify what kind of self-talk 
they refer to in their research. This should allow clearer communication between 
researchers, facilitate a cleaner comparison between self-talk studies, and support the 
consolidation of an increasingly diverse self-talk literature. It is not unreasonable to 
believe that the quality of a synthesis of a research area should be measured by its impact 
on literature by providing an incentive for new research and more inclusive theories 
(Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011). In this sense, the purpose of our review was not 
to present a self-talk model similar to Hardy, Oliver, and Tod (2009) or Van Raalte et al. 
(2016) that implies a series of revealing testable hypotheses. Instead, the purpose of our 
review was to present a conceptualization of self-talk that resonates with self-talk 
researchers. In other words, we wanted to inspire researchers in the fields of sports and 
exercise psychology, sports science, and psychology to use self-talk in its various forms 
as variables in their empirical research and as constructs in the elaboration of integrative 
theories. Of course, such an endeavor will ultimately contribute to the development of 
new and fascinating research questions. 
Dialogic self-talk nature 
Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens, et al. (2019) also argued that we had overlooked 
recent speculation that self-talk is dialogical in nature. We would like to point out that 
this is inaccurate. In our review we have highlighted a study in which the dynamic 
interplay of spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk was explicitly explored (Latinjak, 
2018). The results of this study showed a strong sequential relationship between 
spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk, reinforcing the suggestion that intuitive thinking 
processes, including spontaneous self-talk, occur ahead of rational processes, including 
goal-directed self-talk (Kahneman, 2011; Van Raalte et al., 2016). Evidence of inverse 
sequencing also emerged with reports of spontaneous self-talk occurring after goal-
directed self-talk, suggesting that the former may also represent the intuitive response to 
the latter. Following findings of this and many other studies on inner dialogue (Alderson-
Day et al., 2016), we have explicitly referred in our conceptualization to the dialogic 
nature of the self-talk and mentioned the “dynamic interplays between organic, 
spontaneous and goal-directed cognitive processes” (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 
2019; p. 363). All in all, we would conclude that Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens et al. agree 
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with our view that the dynamics of inner dialogue are a high priority for future self-talk 
research to address. 
Self-talk Assessment 
Another important concern of Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens, et al. (2019) deals 
with the assessment of self-talk. Although we argue that all self-talk sampling methods 
have advantages and limitations, we consider it inappropriate that Van Raalte, Vincent, 
Dickens et al. chose to comment to our review in order to present an argument in favor 
of their preferred method (descriptive experience sampling) over other methods, 
especially as the authors have previously introduced the method (Dickens, Van Raalte, & 
Hurlburt, 2018 and Van Raalte, Vincent, & Dickens, 2019). Their main argument against 
the methodological approaches that we have used in our previous research (Latinjak, 
Masó, & Comoutos, 2018; Latinjak et al., 2014; Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Chroni, 
Theodorakis, & Papaioannou, 2009) centered around two complementary criticisms 
regarding sampling and categorization. With regard to sampling, Van Raalte, Vincent, 
Dickens et al. argued that we made extensive use of questionnaire-based data without 
addressing relevant issues of validity. We would like to give a general answer, as self-
talk measurement is itself a challenging research topic (Brinthaupt, Benson, Kang, & 
Moore, 2015). 
First and foremost, it must be acknowledged that all thought sampling methods 
have limitations (de Guerrero, 2005). This is mainly due to the often hidden and 
subjective nature of the phenomenon (Brinthaupt et al., 2015). Therefore, the use of 
multiple data-sampling approaches with different respective advantages and limitations 
has been advocated (Alderson- Day & Fernyhough, 2015; Latinjak, 2018). In our 
research, we have repeatedly used retrospective techniques to create a pool of self-
statements that athletes use to express current psychological experiences or self-regulate 
and progress on a task (Latinjak et al., 2018). This method has been endorsed for its open-
ended format, which encourages volunteers to list self-generated instances of inner speech 
as opposed to theoretically preconceived contents (Morin, Duhnych, & Racy, 2018). Of 
course, like all methods, it comes with limitations, mainly related to mnemonic biases 
associated with its retrospective nature, attentional bias, leading participants to be more 
aware of some self-talk than others, and report bias, where volunteers may be more 
willing to report some self-talk than others. Yet, in sport specifically, this method has 
been useful in analyzing self-statements that can later be subdivided into relevant self-
talk categories (Hardy, Gammage, & Hall, 2001; Latinjak et al., 2014). 
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Another method that has helped to advance our understanding of self-talk involves 
psychometric questionnaires, such as the Automatic Self-Talk Questionnaire for Sports 
(ASTQS; Zourbanos et al., 2009). The ASTQS has been validated, adapted to other 
languages (Latinjak, Viladrich, Alcaraz, & Torregrosa, 2016), and used repeatedly to 
study organic self-talk in relation to variables such as self-efficacy, flow, and motivation 
(Ada, Comoutos, Karamitrou, & Kazak, 2019; Karamitrou, Comoutos, Hatzigeorgiadis, 
& Theodorakis, 2017; Zourbanos et al., 2016). However, as the ASTQS was developed 
before distinguishing between spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk, a review of the 
instrument is timely in order to confirm (or not) its utility for continuing to advance the 
area. 
Other sampling methods in which self-talk is recorded shortly after it occurs 
involve immediate recall procedures (Latinjak et al., 2018) and include naturalistic video-
assisted approaches (Martinent, Ledos, Ferrand, Campo, & Nicolas, 2015). These 
methods have proven effective when studying the relation between organic self-talk and 
other psychological processes, such as emotions and performance. Finally, as promoted 
by Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens, et al. (2019), instances of self-talk can also be collected 
while they appear via concurrent self-talk sampling procedures (Van Raalte et al., 2019). 
On one hand, these are the only procedures that provide samples of self-talk that has 
definitely occurred. On the other hand, questions are raised as to how far these data 
collection processes change the natural occurrence of self-talk (Greco, 2017). Clearly, the 
descriptive experience sampling technique has its strengths; nonetheless, we do not 
believe it is the panacea for the assessment of self-talk. Despite the criticisms of each 
procedure, we concur with Alderson-Day and Fernyhough (2015) that a wide range of 
methods and approaches is the solution to the challenge of studying self-talk 
scientifically. Of importance is whether the researcher’s approach is “fit for purpose”; 
that is, its fit with the research question being investigated. 
In addition to data sampling, a second methodological problem identified by Van 
Raalte, Vincent, Dickens, et al. (2019) relates to the categorization of data in self-talk 
research. They pointed out that the existing self-talk literature may be based on 
researcher-created categories and functions identified by researchers rather than on actual 
experiences of athletes. With particular regard to our conceptual model of self-talk, Van 
Raalte, Vincent, Dickens et al. argued that the integrative conceptualization is built on 
dubious foundations that we have not addressed critically. To what extent we have 
addressed such issues in the limitation sections of our articles is not worth discussing. We 
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seem to all agree that the interpretations of researchers and athletes differ when it comes 
to categorizing organic self-talk statements (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Zourbanos, 
2017; Van Raalte, Cornelius, Copeskey, & Brewer, 2014). However, it is important that 
we do not assume that the interpretations of athletes are more important than those of 
researchers. 
Although it is obvious that researchers have limited access to the interpretive 
element of self-talk (Hardy, 2006), it is also reasonable to assume that athletes are 
sometimes unaware of the functions of their self-talk. In addition, the judgment of athletes 
could be distorted, for example, by the impact their self-talk has had on subsequent 
performance. We believe that researcher-created categories may have greater theoretical 
value, as researchers are best placed, for example, to link goal-directed self-talk functions 
to important theories in sports psychology, leading to integrative outcomes (see, for 
examples, Latinjak et al., 2014; Van Raalte, Morrey, Cornelius, & Brewer, 2015). As a 
point in case, we recently linked goal-directed statements such as “try and have fun” or 
“you owe it to the team” to aspects of self-determination theory (i.e., intrinsic and 
introjected behavioral regulations, respectively; Latinjak, Torregrossa, Comoutos, 
Hernando-Gimeno, & Ramis, 2019). Regardless of this, we also recognize that the 
participation of athletes in the categorization procedures in (idiosyncratic) self-talk 
studies is essential to grasp the authentic self-talk experience (Miles & Neil, 2013). 
Conclusions 
To conclude, we propose to researchers in terms of self-talk research methods to 
provide detailed reasons for the selected methods in their studies. Any method can lead 
to insightful results, and every method has limitations. A one size-fits-all approach, 
whether questionnaires or descriptive experience sampling, cannot adequately represent 
a phenomenon that is not accessible by objective means. We must recognize the 
limitations of all methods, accept the use of different sampling methods, and, when the 
literature base surrounding organic self-talk has grown sufficiently, appraise the results 
derived from different approaches. We would expect such reviews to eventually highlight 
similarities across self-talk reports that point toward the facets of the self-talk literature 
that are more trustworthy. 
With a similar spirit, we also appreciate the current discussion about 
conceptualization as an important step forward in the self-talk literature. In science, both 
argumentation and critique are essential to new knowledge (Osborne, 2010). Although 
Van Raalte, Vincent, Dickens, et al. (2019) rated our work as unfortunate on four 
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occasions in their comment, we prefer to see our discrepancies with Judy Van Raalte’s 
research group as growth opportunities. Although strong opinions and personal 
identification with ideas often lead to misinterpretation of evidence (Lench, Bench, & 
Flores, 2013), insightful and challenging comments trigger further reflection and 
clarification of theory. For example, it was a misinterpretation to infer from our review 
that goal-directed self-talk is ever predetermined or prefixed. However, it provided a 
welcomed opportunity to comment on four aspects critical to the distinction between 
organic and strategic self-talk: conscious use of goal-directed self-talk; self-managed 
strategic self-talk interventions; transference of strategic cue words into organic, goal-
directed self-talk; as well as organic and strategic self-talk as neurologically distinguished 
phenomena. 
Moreover, despite our discrepancies, which are still to be solved in sports self-talk 
research, we see a decisive agreement between the works of various research groups. 
Some self-talk, spontaneous or System 1, reflects current psychological processes and 
facilitates awareness or anticipation of psychological challenges (Van Raalte et al., 2016). 
Other self-talk, goal-directed or System 2, is used as a psychological skill that leads to 
various forms of self-regulation. We therefore agree that (organic) self-talk is a key 
mechanism for self-control. It plays a critical role in raising awareness of psychological 
challenges, in selecting psychological skills, in supporting the exercise of such skills, and 
in monitoring changes concerning the original psychological challenge. 
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